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''That Vast Experiment''
The New Brunswick Militia's 1865
Cam.p of Instruction
J. Brent Wilson

n July 1865, almost 1,000 New Brunswick
militiamen assembled in Fredericton for a
twenty-four day Camp of Instruction. This was
the first time peacetime militia training on this
scale was ever attempted in British North
America. At the time, and since, the camp was
praised as a notable achievement. New
Brunswick's lieutenant-governor and provincial
commander-in-chief, Arthur Hamilton Gordon,
wrote: "The entire success of this experiment is
admitted with an unanimity which is remarkable,
because rare in this Province. "1 Although the
uniqueness of the camp has been the subject of
some interest, it has never been subjected to
more in-depth analysis. This article moves
beyond generalizations to examine the purpose
of the camp and what actually transpired. The
Camp of Instruction tells us a great deal about
the nature and character of New Brunswick's
militia on the eve of Confederation, and its
outcome helps to explain why the province
moved toward political union as an answer to
the inadequate state ofits defences.

I

Revitalizing the Militia
y the early 1860s, the need to reform the
late colonial militia system in New
Brunswick was evident. Improved relations with
the United States a decade earlier had led the
provincial legislature to suspend those sections
of the militia law affecting annual drills, making
it impossible to carry out training. Interest in
reviving the militia received a boost in the late
1850s, when the growth of the volunteer
movement in Britain and then British North

B

America led to the formation of some 20
Volunteer companies within the New Brunswick
militia by the end of 1860. However, the threat
of war with the United States resulting from their
Civil War, especially after the Trent Crisis of
1861-1862, and Britain's growing desire to
withdraw from British North America made it
obvious that the province had to strengthen its
defences, particularly the effectiveness of the
militia. The new lieutenant-governor, Arthur
Gordon, spearheaded this effort. 2
When Gordon arrived in October 1861, the
province's first line of defence against a possible
invasion from the south was provided by British
military forces. Royal Navy warships operating
out of Halifax defended the coast while a British
infantry battalion, split between Fredericton and
Saint John, and Royal Artillery contingent based
in Saint John, provided land defence, especially
of the vital overland winter route that ran
between Saint John and the St. Lawrence River.
New Brunswick's contribution to its own defence
was its militia system. At the time, it consisted
of a small, underfunded Volunteer corps made
up of various poorly organized and drilled
companies; the county militia which existed
mainly on paper and functioned more as a social
club than a military force; and an inadequate
headquarters staff.
Drawing on his earlier experience as colonel
of a Scottish Volunteer regiment, Gordon
undertook several measures aimed at
rejuvenating the militia system, including
revamping the officer corps, especially among
the Volunteers, and re-staffing headquarters. In
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1862, Gordon oversaw passage of a new act
designed to revive the militia. Among its chief
features was the reorganization of the force into
two basic categories: active (fit men between 18
and 45) and sedentary (fit men between 45 and
60). Each category was further divided into subclasses. In the case of the active force it consisted
of Class A (the Volunteers), Class B (single men
and widowers without children), and Class C
(married men and widowers with children). The
Volunteers, composed of an all-arms corps
organized into companies, with short periods of
training would be kept fit for active service. The
remaining classes of the active militia would be
mustered and enrolled one day a year. The
sedentary militia represented simply a reserve
of manpower; it would assemble only
occasionally for enrollment and would be called
out only in wartime. The new militia act would
remain in effect for three years and then would
have to be renewed. By placing the Volunteers at
the centre of the revitalized militia, New
Brunswick took the lead in militia reform among
the British North American provinces with
passage of the 1862 act. 3 Unfortunately, the
militia appropriation attached to the bill was
severely reduced by the government.
Following passage of the law, Gordon
undertook further reforms directed mostly at the
Volunteer companies, including improving the
quality of the officer corps, providing arms and
facilities for drilling, and securing more financial
aid for the Volunteers. By 1864, the Volunteers
numbered some 1, 700 troops. They consisted
of three troops of cavalry (one organized as
hussars and the others as mounted infantry);
seven batteries of artillery; one company of
engineers, located in Saint John; and 21
companies of infantry (six formed the Saint John
Volunteer Battalion, and the other 15 were
attached to the county battalions). 4 However, they
remained confined mainly to urban areas, they
were small in numbers (leaving aside the New
Brunswick Regiment of Artillery, the Saint John
Volunteers and the 1st Battalion of the York
County Regiment from Fredericton, more than
half the companies numbered fewer than 50
men), and they were short of modern weapons
and equipment, particularly field artillery. 5
Despite these shortcomings, by 1864 Gordon
was reasonably satisfied with the state of the
Volunteer force. 6

The remainder of the active force, however,
- the B and C Class men - continued to be a
serious problem. Being called out only on muster
day for enrolling, it had once again become a
paper force, with many of the 38 battalions
lacking officers. Gordon appointed some new
officers and provided them with basic training,
and organized annual call outs, but local political
opposition to the militia appropriation and
uneven popular support for militia service
contributed to its ongoing ineffectiveness.
Gordon pointed to the fundamental problem of
implementing this militia system in a largely
rural, agricultural province when he wrote:
... to call the whole male population together for
any long period, the rich merchant from his
counting house- the needy settler from his half
cleared farm - the lumberer from the woods the ploughman from the field- the boatman from
the river, would be as oppressive as it is in fact
impracticable. As it is, the pecuniary sacrifice
entailed by one day's muster is greaU

Gordon also faced pressure from another
direction. By 1864, the issue of militia reform
had taken on greater importance within the
context of imperial politics, as the British
government had begun pushing British North
America more firmly toward political union and
toward self-defence. 8 In spite of Gordon's efforts,
Edward Cardwell, the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, was dissatisfied with the state of the
local force, writing in October 1864, that "the
progress of the Militia in New Brunswick does
not at present in any degree correspond with
the spirit of patriotism and spirit of loyalty by
which the inhabitants are known to be
animated. "9
Gordon replied with a lengthy despatch,
detailing the measures he had taken over the
last three years to re-organize both the
Volunteers and militia. He went on to remind
the Secretary that, although self-defence was an
important provincial duty,
it must be remembered that the very maintenance
of self-existence imperatively requires the outlay
of the greater part of the Provincial Revenue on
objects and institutions which, in an older
country, have been already established, or are
maintained by private enterprise. 10

Cardwell, somewhat mollified by this report,
nevertheless again urged Gordon to move
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New Brunswick militiamen parading beside the Fredericton Exhibition Building during the Camp of
Instruction. Each soldier received a government-issued redfiannel tunic and blue flannel cap. but wore his
own trousers and boots. which "did not always make for uniformity.··

forward with further reforms, informing the
lieutenant-governor in December that "it must
be borne in mind that self-defence is the first
duty of every free people. " 11
With pressure from London mounting
Gordon moved ahead with plans to revitalize the
rest of the active militia. In January 1865, he
assembled a commission, made up of senior
militia officers, that recommended changes to
the militia system. Foremost among these was a
twenty-eight day Camp oflnstruction to be held
annually for a representation of the active militia
gathered from across the province. The force
would be composed of 64-man companies drawn
from each of the 36 battalions in the province,
making a total of 2,204 troops. They would be
composed of volunteers or if that proved
inadequate of men selected by ballot. 12
The purpose of the camp was left vague, the
commission's report stating only that it "would
be of permanent benefit to the Militia Force of
this Province. " 13 However, it was generally
assumed that its purpose was to provide a select
number of militiamen with intensive training
under drill instructors and they would then

return home to act as a cadre to improve the
standard of training throughout the rest of their
battalion. 14 Heartened by the commission's
report, Gordon introduced several of the
recommended changes in the new militia bill
being prepared to replace that of 1862, which
was due to expire, including the Camp of
Instruction.
The decision to hold this extended camp met
with strong opposition both from local sources
and from within official circles. The Fredericton
newspaper, the New Brunswick Reporter, a
staunch enemy of the govemment, described the
camp as "this most outrageous measure," and
opposed it for several reasons. Reacting to the
method to be used for recruiting the troops,
especially the provision for drafting by ballot, it
stated:
men will not submit to be forced from their
homes, their business and their merchandise,
in order to gratify a ridiculous whim of the
belligerent Executive Council; and they have no
idea of being placed in a Camp of wild and
perhaps dissolute young men at a time when
there is no necessity whatever, especially when
it is to be feared that the instruction in immorality
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and drunkenness will be more rapid than in
military drill and discipline.

Moreover, it objected to recruiting from what it
described as a "loose and floating population
which, although it is here to-day may be away
tomorrow." It feared that these "birds of passage"
would not be available in an emergency or that
in some cases they might use their military
training against the state.
The Reporter also argued against the scheme
of drilling a select group of troops in a single
place.
If the young men now in Camp could on their
return home be employed as so many drill
instructors in their own districts, the system
would work admirably; but this it is not
pretended they will become and consequently
whatever military advantage may be obtained on
the present occasion can only be communicated
by the commissioned officers in their several
districts ...

The War Office in London also voiced similar
concerns about the training scheme. Earl de
Grey, the Secretary of State for War, referred the
militia commission's recommendations to senior
officers for their opinions. The Inspector General
of Militia believed that it would be preferable to
have the funds devoted to the annual training of
the whole regiment for a lesser number of days.
Similarly, the Inspector General of Volunteers
wrote that, assuming the purpose of the camp
was to obtain a sufficient number of trained men
to act afterwards as drill instructors of the
battalion, he believed it would have been better
for the regulars to furnish the required
instructors. Moreover, following the proposed
plan would require several years to drill all the
companies of the battalion, since only one would
be instructed each year. 17
These fears aside, the major source of
concern was the limited availability of funds. As
Gordon saw it, the alternative before the
legislature was,

It would have been far better, it stated, if these

officers had been assembled at headquarters and
"under a thorough system of instruction so
drilled as to render them competent to spread
the military leaven throughout the whole
Province." They supported the recommendation
made by others within the province for a School
of Instruction for militia officers as a more
economical and effective option.

whether they would call out a large body of men
for a short time, or a smaller body for a more
lengthened period. I think they chose wisely in
determining on the latter course, as it will
certainly enable more to be effected with the
limited grant at my disposal for Militia purposes,
than any other plan, though, had that grant been
larger, I am not prepared to say that a measure
having a larger field of operation would not have
proved more beneficial.

Finally, the paper opposed the camp on
financial grounds, arguing that in the current
period of economic decline and given the
"embarrassed" state of the province's finances,
the "situation" facing the province did not
warrant the expenditure of such a large sum of
money. 15

Caught in the middle between the Colonial Office
pressing for greater provincial responsibility for
self-defence and local opposition adverse to
spending more money on the militia, Gordon
concluded that the Camp of Instruction was the
best possible arrangement, given the limited
funds, for providing "real effective training." 18

Perhaps more importantly, the British
military also opposed the camp. Calling it "that
vast experiment," Major General Sir Hastings
Doyle, the Commander of the British Forces in
the Lower Provinces, believed the funds might
have been better used instructing a larger body
of officers and men for a shorter period. Doyle's
chief concern was that the militiamen would
object to the discomfort of such prolonged
service and the imposition of stricter military
discipline. He feared that the experience would
leave the men disgusted with the militia service. 16

The new Militia Act became law in late May
1865, again placing New Brunswick in the
forefront of the movement to reform the militia
throughout British North America. As David
Facey-Crowther pointed out in his study of the
New Brunswick militia, Gordon's efforts "created
for the province a militia system that the
Dominion's new minister of militia [Sir GeorgeEtienne Cartier] was to call the best in Canada." 19
Despite the fact that the militia appropriation
attached to the law was dramatically increased
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to $30,000, the scale of the camp was to be
reduced considerably. 20 It was decided to hold
the camp in Fredericton in early July. On 1 June
the Adjutant General of the Militia, LieutenantColonel Thomas Anderson, issued orders to
various battalions directing them to furnish a
company for the camp, generally consisting of a
captain, lieutenant, ensign, 60 privates and a
bugler. The soldiers would receive a tunic and
cap but were expected to furnish everything else,
including clothes (pants, shirts and stockings),
boots, towel and blanket, and eating utensils.
Officers would supply their own uniform and
equipment.
Likely being aware of some of the misgivings
about the camp, the Adjutant General further
instructed: "It is desirable that the Men for the
Camp should as far as possible be selected from
people who are residing in the District, and not
from the Migratory Population. "21 Commanding
officers responded quickly to these orders and
within a short time the quotas were filled by
enthusiastic volunteers, without having to resort
to the draft. The men were then organized into
the companies that would attend the camp.

The Camp of Instruction

T

he troops that entered the camp in
Fredericton on 5 and 6 July came mainly
from the various militia battalions of the central
and southern counties of the province (Carleton,
Charlotte, Kings, Queens, Saint John, Sunbury,
and York). 22 Contingents also came from the
Saint John Volunteers, the New Brunswick
Regiment of Artillery and the New Brunswick
Regiment ofYeomanry Cavalry. New Brunswick's
railroad network was still in a rudimentary state
in the mid 1860s, and so many of the troops
followed a circuitous route to reach Fredericton.
Those from the southern region railed to Saint
John and Woodstock, and then boarded
steamers for the trip along the St. John River,
stopping as they went to pick up detachments
at river landings. Within a few days 94 7 all ranks
had gathered in the capital.
Once assembled, most of the troops went into
barracks provided by the recently constructed
Exhibition Building of the Agricultural Society
of York County at the corner of Saunders and
York Streets at the rear of the city. The

handsomely arched and domed building
furnished comfortable quarters for about 620
men. The ground floor provided sleeping space
for many of the troops, as well as orderly rooms,
paymaster's office, quartermaster's store, and
reading room filled with books, magazines and
copies of most of the province's newspapers.
Some of the men also slept in berths located in
the extensive galleries below the dome. Windows
were removed to provide ventilation during the
height of Fredericton's summer heat. The
remainder of the troops stayed in the adjacent
outbuildings.
The officers either slept in town or in large
tents set up on the surrounding grounds, which
consisted of a three and a half acre show yard
and a 50-acre level piece of ground ringed by a
mile long race course that stretched south from
behind the Exhibition Palace toward the foot of
the heights behind the city and to the west past
present-day Westmorland Street. The hospital
marquee and medical officer's tent were located
at the far end of the track. For the further
e~oyrnent of the troops, a canteen that sold beer,
porter and general store articles was set up by a
Fredericton keeper just outside of the
agricultural grounds. A sergeant was posted here
to prevent drunkenness, and the authorities
threatened the proprietor with heavy penalties
if he sold spirits.
The troops were formed into two active
service battalions of seven companies, complete
with field officers and staff, who ran the interior
management of the battalions according to
regular army standards. The first battalion was
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel the
Honourable Lemuel Allan Wilmot, a Supreme
Court justice and future lieutenant-governor, who
commanded the 1st Battalion of the York County
Militia based in Fredericton. The second
battalion was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
William T. Baird, who was commanding officer
of the 1st Battalion of the Carleton County Militia
located upriver in Woodstock and the deputy
quartermaster general.
In order to improve the overall training of
the militia's officers corps- "the key stone of the
entire Militia movement," according to General
Doyle 23 - additional officers were called for, and
so 45 officers served as private soldiers in an
"Officers Company" commanded by Lieutenant43
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Many of the milita officers attending the Camp of Instruction slept in tents pitched on the extensive ground
ringed by the Fredericton race course.

Colonel the Honourable John Hamilton Gray,
the attorney general and future Father of
Confederation, who was also commanding officer
of the Queen's New Brunswick Rangers from
Loch Lomond near Saint John. The presence of
this Officer's Company, together with the
battalions' field and company officers, meant that
a substantial number of the militia's officer corps
were present at the camp. 24
The camp staff and drill instructors were
provided by the British regulars garrisoning the
city, the 15th Regiment of Foot, and the provincial
militia's permanent staff. They included a camp
commandant, Capt. H.J. Hallowes of the 15th,
serving with the temporary rank of lieutenant
colonel of militia, quartermaster general, brigade
major, paymaster and medical officer.
The government furnished each soldier with
a red flannel tunic and blue flannel forage cap,
but each man wore his own trousers and boots.
As J. W. Millidge, a Volunteer from a Saint John
battery of the NB Regiment of Artillery, wrote
sardonically this arrangement "did not always
make for uniformity. "25 The gunners from the
Regiment of Artillery wore blue tunics. Each man
also received his rations, a straw mattress, a
bolster or narrow pillow, field blanket and rifle
rack. The volunteers were paid for the duration

of the camp, the amounts ranging from 50 cents
a day for privates to $3.00 for field officers and
adjutants, plus a dollar for forage.
The training programme began almost at
once and followed a progressive schedule. The
troops began with basic drill, including facings,
marching the goose step and forming fours. It
was found that about two-thirds of them were
completely undrilled and, of the remainder, only
a few had received more than a week's
instruction. Not surprisingly, the first few days
of drill were difficult. On 7 July, the first full day
of camp, the New Brunswick Reporter stated:
"Of course they do not as yet present a very
military appearance. Many of them are rather
awkward, while some few have not music enough
in their souls to learn to beat time, and will never
make soldiers ... "26
On the 1Oth and 11th each soldier received
a rifle, bayonet and waist belt, and now "begins
to feel himself a soldier. "27 For the next week they
moved through more rigorous training. They
began with manual exercises, where they were
taught the 30 motions required to load and fire
their weapons. At first, the drilling was
interminable, but after a few days of counting,
"the hammers came down with remarkable
precision. "28 They then moved on to company

44
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss2/5

6

Wilson: “The Vast Experiment”: The New Brunswick Militia’s 1865 Camp of I

drill directed by drill instructors from the 15th
or the most competent NCOs from among the
volunteers. Simple battalion movements under
command of their colonels then followed, when
according to Millidge, the Saint John Volunteer
artilleryman, "the fun commenced, companies
finding themselves unexpectedly in awkward
situations. "29 However, the troops quickly
mastered the intricate movements, as the New
Brunswick Reporter noted.
One of the most difficult manoeuvres on parade
is considered to be wheeling in solid column,
and this was attempted on [the llth] by Col.
Wilmot's battalion, the movement was steadily
executed, the men came round beautifully, and
during the wheel elicited the repeated 'well done'
of their delighted commander. 30

They also drilled briefly as a brigade consisting
of the two militia battalions and the 15th
Regiment under the commandant.
On the 18th the troops' first major test came
when the brigade was inspected by Governor
Gordon and General Doyle, who was
accompanied by the Marquis and Marchioness
of Drogheda. The troops, "looking somewhat
sun-bumt and weather stained, but all the more
like their work," received the reviewing party with
a general salute and march past. 31 Doyle then
addressed the troops in complimentary terms.
Training resumed with platoon exercises
until the 22nd, when a grand review of the
brigade was held. Hundreds of civilian onlookers
watched as the brigade commanded Col. J.

Amber Cole of the 15th marched past in quick
time led by the regulars. Following this the
volunteers formed two sides of a square and
looked on as the 15th trooped the colour and
presented bayonet exercises. The brigade then
reassembled and carried out a long list of
manoeuvres, including forming mass columns
and wheeling into contiguous columns.
Afterwards, Cole congratulated them on their
conduct at camp, and assured them their
performance on the parade ground equalled that
of other militia regiments he had inspected. 32
The brigade then marched back to barracks in
close columns, "to the soul-inspiring music of
the band. "33
The busy schedule continued on the 24th,
when the militia force and the band of the 15th
participated in a March Out under the
commandant. The troops filed out of the grounds
led by the Officer's Company, which formed the
advance guard and skirmished where the ground
permitted a company to advance in extended
order. They moved through town to the river
bank, where they halted, piled arms and stood
easy. After a time they returned to barracks.
Over the last few days of the camp the
volunteers heard a series of lectures on such
subjects as the destructive power of the new arms
that had replaced the Brown Bess and recent
military events, including the Relief ofLucknow
during the Indian Mutiny and the Defence of
Kars. These lectures were supposed to show the
volunteers what a small number of welldisciplined troops under a gallant and

Panoramic view of the camp training field. The militiamen forming square in the centre are framed by the
hospital marquee in the foreground and the domed Exhibition Building in the background.
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determined commander could accomplish under
the most difficult circumstances. 34
On the 27th, the force assembled on the
parade ground for the last time and then
marched back to the Exhibition Building where
they surrendered their rifles. They were then
addressed by Governor Gordon who
complimented them on their progress and their
conduct in camp, and noted that he possessed
officers whom he could look to confidently in an
hour of need.
The next day the troops marched to the river
to board steamers for home. They were seen off
by Col. Cole, the officers of the 15th and the
citizens of Fredericton.

How Successful was the Experiment?

J1

t the time, the camp was seen generally as a
success. Gordon wrote to Cardwell,
that the camp, "notwithstanding the many
difficulties incident to a first attempt of the kind,
was attended with even more complete success
than I had, when most sanguine, ventured to
anticipate." 35 Cardwell later replied that, "Her
Majesty's Government have observed with
satisfaction the success which appears to have
attended the Meeting of the first Camp under
the provisions of the recent Militia law of the
Province. "36 This might be considered high
praise, given the tone of their correspondence a
year earlier. Even the New Brunswick Reporter,
which had strongly opposed holding the camp,
wrote:

~reat

Whether the late experiment will prove successful
in its designs or not, it is satisfactory to state
that the Volunteers have attained an astonishing
proficiency in their drill, time being considered,
and their exemplary conduct as a whole, taken
as they were from all ranks of young men in New
Brunswick, reflects the highest credit, not only
on themselves, but on the Province at large. 37

Clearly, many of the concerns raised before
the troops assembled did not arise during the
camp. First, the militiamen, seemingly displaying
the spirit of patriotism and loyalty Cardwell had
been calling for, came forward willingly in
adequate numbers, thereby avoiding the negative
consequences of having to draft men by ballot.
Second, rather than being "birds of passage,"

the men were "veritable sons of the soil,"
according to The Head Quarters. 38 In fact, they
represented a rather select segment of the
population. As Gordon noted, " ... the men
generally who had volunteered for duty were
permanent residents in the country, with fixed
occupations and settled places of abode, and not
drawn from the more migratory part of the
population."39 Almost half of them listed their
trade or occupation as farmer or farmer's son.
The rest included everything from labourers and
carpenters, to blacksmiths and shoemakers,
clerks, students and some with no calling. Over
a third were Anglican by religion, another quarter
were Methodists and Baptists, and the rest were
Presbyterians and Catholics. It is also likely that
a significant number of them were literate. 40 Nor
did the experience contribute unduly to the men's
immorality and drunkenness. Gordon, among
others, noted that the troops were well-behaved
and the provost sergeant was relatively inactiveY
And finally, the camp was run very economically,
with at least $8,500 left over from the province's
$30,000 appropriation. 42
Nevertheless, a closer analysis shows that
some of the weaknesses endemic to the militia
force of the period surfaced at the camp. First.
the troops who attended the camp did not
represent the entire province as had been called
for by the militia commission. Because of the
financial constraints imposed by the province,
Gordon decided to collect the force from those
counties that were within easy access of
Fredericton. Therefore, those present came
mainly from the Western District, representing
the central and southern portions of the
province, and the eastern and northern units,
especially from the francophone areas, were
absent. 43 This also meant that the size of the
force was less than half the number
recommended by the commission. Consequently,
the benefits of the training were confined to only
part of the province's militia force.
Second was the level and nature of their
training. The camp routine made allowance for
much training at all levels, and many of the
troops achieved a high degree of proficiency in a
short time, especially those companies that had
an experienced officer or drill instructor attached
to them. 44 However, the officers reviewing the
troops, perhaps detecting an exaggerated sense
of accomplishment, but not wanting to dampen

46
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spirits, hinted that their training was still at a
basic level. On the 18th, Doyle congratulated the
troops on the competence of their drill, but in
comparing them to the Nova Scotia militia he
stated: "Now, I cannot say that you excel them,
but this I may say, that you come so near them
that I think you must be their first cousins."45
Similarly, Col. Cole of the 15th qualified his
remarks by stating that the militia's performance
on the 22nd equalled that of other troops he had
inspected that had been called out "for ordinary

stark contrast to the Fredericton camp. Every
ten days four or five militia battalions arrived in
camp to receive light infantry training and
practical field instruction, learning, for example,
how to strike, pitch and pack tents. They also
fired 20 rounds of blank ammunition by file and
volley, and were taught how to move with the
regulars across country to attack strong
positions. The camp was organized by Colonel
Garnet Wolseley, the Assistant-QuartermasterGeneral of the British troops in Canada, who
wrote, "My chief aim was to afford officers and

Militiamen practice forming square on the training field.

training - I do not mean permanently
embodied. "46
More importantly, although the troops were
taught to manoeuvre alongside the regulars in a
brigade formation, it appears that most of the
movements, such as forming squares, were
based on conventional tactics that would likely
be of limited use in British North America. This
was made especially clear by the recent American
experience on the battlefield, where modern
weaponry compelled them to experiment with
new tactics based on fire and movement and field
entrenchments. Nor is there any indication that
the troops gained real familiarity with their
weapons by engaging in musketry practice or
sham battles using blank ammunition.
The camp of training and observation held
in Thorold, Ontario a year later in the wake of
the debacle at the Battle of Ridgeway stands in

men instruction in the practical work which real
war presents, and to avoid repeating drill-book
manoeuvres which never could be required in
Canada such as forming squares, etc. "47
As well, training in Fredericton was limited
exclusively to the infantry. Contingents from the
NB Regiment of Artillery attended with four
cannon, but aside from the review on the 18th,
when they demonstrated their gun drill, they
trained mostly as foot soldiers. 48 Similarly, the
mounted cavalry was no where in evidence, and
they too trained as infantry. 49 A chief weakness
of the militia had always been that it was
predominantly an infantry force and the camp
did little to redress this imbalance. Third was
their standards of fitness and discipline. Several
observers noted that the men remained quite fit
throughout the camp and the doctors had little
to keep them busy. 50 And as was noted above,
the troops were well-behaved both while in camp

47
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1997

9

Canadian Military History, Vol. 6 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 5

as well as in town, despite provocations from
some of Fredericton's young men. 51
However, these observations glossed over
some problems. If the sick list was short, it is
also evident that not everyone could withstand
the rigorous training; for as the camp
quartermaster general noted, by the end of the
camp more than 60 men had been discharged
under medical certificates as being unfit for
duty. 52 Their march discipline also left something
to be desired, as was seen on their March Out
on the 24th. It was an excessively hot day and,
perhaps not surprisingly, they did not march in
good order. As Col. Baird pointed out, when the
troops halted by the river, they made a mad dash
to gulp down water, loosing equipment in the
process. The disorder continued on the return
march. Alluding to the Union army's recent drive
to the sea through Georgia and the Carolinas,
Baird wrote:
the break from Sherman's ranks, in his
celebrated march through Virginia [sic] on the
hen roosts and piggeries, were cast in the shade
by the raid of our fellows on the wells and springs
in the line ofmarch ... paper shirt collars strewed
the road ... and when at two and a half miles below
Fredericton the command 'Halt, front' was given,
the idea to officers of the straggling of an army
was fairly understood. 53

Finally, although the camp took on the routine
of the regular army, it is apparent, Gordon's
claim notwithstanding, that the standards of
camp discipline for the volunteers were
considerably relaxed. Millidge recalled:
. . .one day, a captain of a rural company came to
the Commandant, in a state of great excitement,
saying that one of his men had just deserted,
and wanting to know what was to be done.
'Nothing,' said the Commandant, 'let him go.' 54

The fourth subject of concern was the level
of training and leadership skills possessed by
the officers of the militia. Millidge, for one, was
very skeptical about Gordon's assessment ofthe
quality of his militia officers. He stated that the
tactical knowledge of the battalion commanders
"left much to be desired," and concluded that
the governor's generous comments "led us to
believe that he was either saying the thing that
was not, or that he had seen very little of this
country's defenders." 55

However, Gordon was not blind to some of
the weaknesses still facing the militia's officer
corps. Despite the large numbers of officers
present at the camp from some units, Gordon
himself noted the absence of many others and
cautioned in his Militia General Order No. 43
issued at the end of the camp:
that the Officers of the Militia at large will not
neglect the opportunity afforded them of
becoming acquainted with their duties, and His
Excellency desires it to be distinctly understood
that the acceptance of a Commission renders it
obligatory on the individual accepting it to qualify
himself for the duties it imposes. 5 6

It is very likely that some of the observers
simply decided to ignore or downplay many of
the same problems that had affected the militia
force for years, and instead chose to praise their
finer qualities, perhaps excessively and
misleadingly.

What were the longer-term effects of the
camp? In the fall of 1865 many ofthe Volunteer
and militia units were called out. For example,
Millidge noted that after the camp he joined the
Saint John County Militia and in the autumn
his battalion attempted to put into practice what
had been learned in Fredericton. Bills were
posted everywhere ordering the militia to muster,
and uniforms, weapons and equipment were
gathered up. He noted that nearly 2,000 troops
assembled throughout the district and the rolls
were called. The officers then put them through
basic company and battalion drill. 57 Militia
officials drew at least two conclusions from these
turnouts .
First, there was little doubt that the numbers
of men parading in the above example was very
impressive and an important longer-lasting effect
of the camp was the boost it gave to militia
recruitment and turnout. As Gordon observed:
I am convinced that, apart from the instruction
(by no means inconsiderable) which Officers and
Men have received, a vast amount of popular
prejudice has been dissipated, and spirit
introduced into the Districts from which the men
were drawn, which will be productive of the best
results. 58

Nevertheless, this impressive display was not
uniform throughout the province. For instance,
on 4 October, the Class A companies of the active
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The brigade, consisting of the 15th Regiment (at left) and the two militia service battalions, being inspected,
probably during the review by General Doyle and Governor Gordon on 18 July 1865.
(PANBP5163)

militia from Fredericton and the surrounding
districts of York County mustered for the purpose
of calling the roll and ascertaining numbers.
Some of the companies assembled in good
numbers, but others had hardly quarter
strength. Moreover, some officers appeared in
uniform according to regulations, while others
were without any badge of rank. 59 In fact, a close
analysis of the annual inspection report of
Volunteer companies reveals uneven results. 60
The units from the Eastern District, which were
not present at camp, were small in numbers,
although they had some new recruits who had
joined recently. As well, some of the units from
the Western District that had been represented
at camp also had low turnouts compared with
the actual strength of the unit. For example,
Lieutenant-Colonel George Maunsell, the Acting
Adjutant General, noted that attendance at the
Sunbury County Militia company's turnout was
low because many of the men were absent in the
woods. Clearly, the camp had had positive effects
on annual inspection callouts in some cases, but
in others they remained strictly limited, and
uneven attendance continued to plague the
militia force even after Confederation.
As was seen above, although not stated
explicitly, it was assumed generally that the
troops were supposed to return home with
knowledge and skills they could pass on to their

comrades who were unable to attend camp. How
successful were the troops in imparting useful
military training over the long-term? Maunsell
concluded that this objective had been met
successfully. He wrote:
During my tour of inspection in the Western
District, I observed with much satisfaction the
benefits derived from instruction received at the
Camp oflnstruction at Fredericton. Members of
Companies who previous to joining the Camp,
had some knowledge of drill, are now enabled
by practical experience to impart instruction to
others; whilst of those who had no such previous
knowledge, many have displayed a remarkable
aptitude for its acquisition, and interest in
maintaining it when acquired. 61

A commendable example of this process in
action was provided by the 3rd Battalion of the
Kings' County Militia, which was inspected by
its commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel
Andrew C. Otty in late September. Otty, who had
been a member of the militia commission and
second-in-command of the 1st Service Battalion
at the camp, did his best to pass on the benefits
of the training learned in Fredericton to the rest
of his troops. Following the inspection, he called
out the men who had been on duty at the camp
and exercised them as a company in the presence
of the battalion. He was pleased to find, he
informed the Adjutant General, that "they had
not forgotten that which they had acquired at
49
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The 15th Regiment on parade, probably during the trooping of the colour on 22 July 1865. The regimental
band stands at the left, while the militiamen look on in the lfj'tforeground.
(PANBPS/66)

Camp." Moreover, on his own initiative Otty
invited two other area units - the Sussex Rifles
and Saunders' Mounted Rifles - to join his
battalion for a field day. He formed them into a
large corps and put them through various
infantry evolutionS. 5 2
However, it is unlikely that many others
followed Otty's example. The York County
Militia's callout was only for mustering, and
Millidge's unit's turnout was probably too large
to have learned much in a single day. Again, the
inspection report revealed mixed results. The
level of training found in some units, especially
among the more technically specialized units like
the artillery and engineers, was high, although
it was difficult to link this to the camp, there
being only one direct example of camp
instruction being passed on to the other troops
being cited. However, the state of training in some
units, especially in the eastern and rural areas
was indifferent. It was very likely therefore, that
some of these turnouts were not much more
successful than the muster days of the sedentary
militia of the earlier period.
Indeed, Doyle, despite his praise for the
camp, questioned what lasting effects the camp
would have on the active militia. At the end of
August, he cautioned Gordon that,

further exertions are necessary to place the Militia
of the Province generally in condition to defend
their homes ... No doubt great advantage has been
derived by the return to their homes of those
who were instructed in the Camp at
Fredericton ... by arousing a popular feeling in
favour of the Militia ... That object having been
gained, I should wish to impress upon Your
Excellency the necessity of affording instruction
to the whole of the Militia in New Brunswick ...

Doyle believed that until more money could be
raised to train a larger body of the militia the
province remained in a "comparatively
defenceless state. "63
Moreover, the force continued to face
problems related to training that camps of
instruction could not solve, in particular the
absence of proper drilling facilities and modern
weapons and equipment. This situation
prompted the inspector of the artillery regiment
to conclude that "for all practical purposes, the
force, as it is at present constituted, would be
but a broken reed in an emergency." 64
In the event, these warnings about the
continued shortcomings of the militia and the
relatively defenceless state of the province were
put to the test in April 1866, when the Fenian
crisis struck New Brunswick. 65 After months of
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rumours and alarms about an impending
descent on the province, members of the
Brotherhood burned the customs house on
Indian Island in the Bay of Fundy in mid April.
Subsequent raids were turned back by the
combined forces of the regulars and Volunteers,
and by the end of May the crisis had passed.
During this emergency the government
followed the old colonial tradition used to turn
back the threat from the south of relying on the
regulars stationed in the province as well as army
and navy reinforcements called in from Halifax,
augmented by the Volunteers and militia. Gordon
called out on active service a force of about 1,000
Volunteers from several battalions and organized
some of the militia into home guards. At Saint
John and several stations along the frontier,
including St. Stephen and Woodstock, the New
Brunswickers stood guard and drilled,
performing their defensive duties admirably.
However, despite the Adjutant General's claim
that the crisis had put the Volunteer system "to
a severe test," and that it had "come up to the
expectations of its most ardent admirers, and
proved of infinite value in the hour ofneed," 66 it
was hardly a true test of their efficiency and
training.
In the light of this cns1s, the continued
inadequacies ofthe province's defences became
clear and over the next year this helped to move
New Brunswick, as well as the rest of British
North America, toward Confederation and its
promise of common defence, as a more realistic
response to the security needs of the country. As
John Hamilton Gray, a provincial delegate to the
Charlottetown Conference and the commanding
officer of the Officer's Company at the 1865
camp, wrote the Fenian scare "essentially proved
the necessity of that military organization which,
it was alleged,
would spring from
Confederation. "67

Conclusion

C

learly, the vast experiment of the Fredericton
Camp oflnstruction had been an impressive
achievement. Despite its novel nature, the camp
was thoroughly organized and efficiently run,
laying to rest much of the opposition levelled at
it. In the short-term it had provided those
militiamen who attended the camp with a degree

of intensive training and, more generally, had
increased enthusiasm for militia service in some
places. If its broader purpose was to provide a
cadre of trained militiamen who would pass on
their new knowledge to their comrades, however,
its success had been more limited. Moreover, it
was also apparent that, despite several years of
reform, many of the traditional problems facing
the militia still existed.
Perhaps it would have been unrealistic to
have expected anything other than this outcome.
As Gordon himself stated, a month-long camp
for a select portion of the active militia was the
only real alternative open to him, given the
shortage of funds, and it was only part of an
ongoing programme aimed at upgrading the
overall effectiveness of the militia.
Nevertheless, militia officials continued to
see value in the camp system in 1866. The
Adjutant General wrote:
A desire appears to exist amongst all ranks of
the Militia for further advancement in the
knowledge and practice of military duties. This
desire has increased during the past two years,
chiefly by the results of the Camp of Instruction;
although it may not have met the expectations of
all. .. it cannot be doubted that the Camp of
Instruction has been a means of diffusing a good
practical knowledge of drill throughout the
Province, and showing the system by which the
interior economy of a Battalion is conducted, to
those who otherwise would have no opportunity
of obtaining such information. 68

So in the last year before Confederation, the
government decided to repeat the experiment,
although on a reduced scale and with certain
modifications. The 1866 Camp of Instruction
was held at Camp Torryburn near Saint John in
late June. 69 The turnout numbered only 450
men, less than half the numbers assembled in
Fredericton. However, some lessons had been
learned from the first camp. In particular, the
limited geographic representation of the 1865
camp was rectified, with several contingents
attending from the Eastern District. 70 As well,
this camp moved toward the kind of approach
called for by the critics of the 1865 experiment,
in that a much larger number of officers attended
camp (305 in total), with one of the two
battalions being composed entirely of officers
selected from every battalion in the province. The
lieutenant-governor was particularly pleased
51
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with the turnout and performance of the officers
at camp, writing:
That Officers, -many of them well advanced in
years - some of them Field Officers in the Militia
- two actually in command of Regiments, and
nearly all engaged in professional pursuits from
which their presence could now ill be spared,
should cheerfully devote a month to learn their
duties, and submit to the restraint and drill of
private soldiers, must be a source of gratification
to all who desire the Militia to become of practical
utility and a means of safety to the Province. 71

However, this would be the last time the
camp system was employed in the province. In
1867, summer training for the militia was held
on a much reduced scale, and it would be many
years before the post-Confederation Canadian
militia undertook regular training on the scale
of the New Brunswick Militia's 1865 Camp of
Instruction. 72
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